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Abstract
In this paper we sketch some reflections on the pitfalls and inconsistencies of the research pro-
gram—currently dominant among the profession—aimed at providing microfoundations to macroe-
conomics along a Walrasian perspective. We argue that such a methodological approach constitutes
an unsatisfactory answer to a well-posed research question, and that alternative promising routes
have been long mapped out but only recently explored. In particular, we discuss a recent agent-
based, truly non-Walrasian macroeconomic model, and we use it to envisage new challenges for
future research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper [2], Steve Keen warns econophysicists against using modern economic
theory as a foundation for their work, boosting them instead to learn directly from the
British classical tradition (see [3] for an exact definition of the boundaries separating the
classical and the modern or neoclassical traditions). This paper follows Keen’s footsteps,
with a big caveat. On the one hand, we endorse an accusation repeatedly brought against
modern (neoclassical) economic theory (known also as efficient resource allocation theory),
that is to be empirically and logically flawed.1 How the restricted vision of modern economics
came to dominate the profession till our days is a fascinating chapter of the history of science
which can not be addressed here (see [4, 5]). On the other hand, however, we would like to
underline that economics has been always characterized by the contemporaneous existence of
several competing research traditions, which now and then jumble together. During the last
sixty years it has not been unusual, for instance, to register that harsh criticisms to current
mainstream conceptions were advanced by scholars who actively contributed to put them
at the frontier of the economic discourse. In the war of the models [6] fought by economists
in the academic arena, neoclassicals have won several battles, but their opponents (e.g.,
Austrians, post-Keynesians, behavioralists) have never been completely defeated. On the
contrary, from time to time these latter succeed in converting to their side some generals of
the neoclassical army, who actively train recruits to innovative fighting techniques.
The battleground we choose to exemplify our point is the research program launched
some forty years ago by the neoclassical school, according to which macroeconomics should
be explicitly grounded on microfoundations. Briefly, economic phenomena at a macroscopic
level should be explained as the consequences of the activities undertaken by individual
decision makers. The methodological strategy that has so far gained supremacy is one
based on: i) the precepts of the modern (i.e., rational choice-theoretic) tradition, and ii)
a solution (or closing) concept borrowed from Walrasian competitive general equilibrium
analysis.
1 Neoclassical economics is axiomatic. While it requires internal coherence, so that theorems can be logically
deduced from a set of assumptions, it abstracts from external coherence between theoretical statements
and empirical evidence. Of course, this implies an important epistemological detachment from falsifiable
sciences like physics.
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Some of the key flaws underlying item i) has been presented in [2]. In turn, critical
words against item ii) has been loudly pronounced, among the others, by eminent scholars
who spent most of their academic life in the neoclassical camp [7]. Admittedly, their criti-
cism was at one time well centered and largely neglected, probably because the alternative
methodology they suggested was so close to the mainstream that the disturbing theoretical
results they presented were seen as a nuisance, which could be easily addressed by painless
manipulations of the standard model. The alternative proposal we shall confront with the
Walrasian paradigm in what follows is definitely more radical. As a preliminary step, how-
ever, it seems worthwhile to review why Walrasian microfundations should be considered as
the wrong answer to what is probably the most stimulating research question ever raised in
economics, that is to explain how a completely decentralized economy composed of millions
of (mainly) self-interested people coordinate their actions.
II. ADAM, LE´ON AND THE BUTCHER
Contrary to what is usually thought, the very idea that the economy is a (complex) self-
organizing system is not a new entry in the toolbox of economists got mixed up in complexity,
but it is the key message conveyed in 1776 by the founding father of the discipline, the
Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith, according to whom:
“He [man] generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic
to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing
that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
In civilized society he [man] stands at all times in need of the cooperation
and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain
the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals each
individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its
natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man
has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him
to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he
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can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own
advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another
a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and
you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every offer; and it is in
this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good
offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”
(Smith [8], p. 477 of the 1976 University of Chicago edition.)
Five points deserve to be emphasized. First, the notion of an invisible hand guiding
coordination towards aggregate order in a fully decentralized economy represents an ex-
planandum (i.e., our research question) of theoretical and empirical importance, both for
positive and normative reasons. Second, the explanation of economic phenomena is run in
terms of the actions and reactions of autonomous individuals and not of social categories.
This requires a conceptualization of decision-makers in terms of economic agents, rather than
social classes or races. Third, the economic agent (Smith’s man) envisaged in the quotation
above responds to incentives to improve utility, but he is never requested to maximize it as he
should do if endowed with substantive rationality. Fourth, Smith recognizes self-interest as
being the main force driving decentralized actors towards a coordinated aggregate position,
but he never concedes that greed is the only relevant human trait. Fifth, the work of the
invisible hand yields a social order, but neither is such an order a rest (i.e., an equilibrium)
nor is the best possible solution (i.e., an optimum).
As regards the first two points—the key challenge of explaining how the invisible hand
works and the approach of methodological individualism,2 respectively—the profession has
reached a consensus to which we convincingly adhere. Moving to the last three points, how-
ever, we subscribe to the far less popular claiming that the theoretical approach developed
by the mainstream in dealing with them has proven to be inadequate. Instead of the idea
2 Actually, the path followed by methodological individualism has been rather bumpy, and what is nowadays
commonly accepted by its very notion is somewhat different from the origins. After having brilliantly
repelled the attack of Marxians, the currently established version of methodological individualism is
illustrated by Arrow [9], who acknowledges that individual behavior is always mediated by social relations,
but also that social relations are the outcome of the actions of individual agents.
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of a self-regulating order emerging from the interactions of many simpler components with-
out this “being part of their intentions”, the Holy Trinity of (marginalist) neoclassical eco-
nomics [10]—(substantive) rationality, greed and equilibrium—has soon became the elected
guiding principles of human behavior. In setting the methodological stage for the revolu-
tion—quickly turned into a dictatorship—dubbed Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) macroeconomic theory, Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent bluntly declared:
“An economy following a multivariate stochastic process is now routinely de-
scribed as being in equilibrium, by which is meant nothing more that at each
point in time (a) markets clears and (b) agents act in their own self-interest.
This development, which stemmed mainly from the work of K. J. Arrow [...]
and G. Debreu [...], implies that simply to look at any economic time series and
conclude that it is a disequilibrium phenomenon is a meaningless observation.
[...] The key elements of these models are that agents are rational, reacting to
policy changes in a way which is in their best interests privately, and that the
impulses which trigger business fluctuations are mainly unanticipated shocks.”
(Lucas and Sargent [11], p. 7.)
The self-regulating order of Smith was therefore transformed into a competitive General
Equilibrium (GE) in the form elaborated in the 1870s by Le´on Walras [12], that is a con-
figuration of (fully flexible) prices and plans of action such that, at those prices, all agents
can carry out their chosen plans and, consequently, markets clear. In a continuous effort of
generalization and analytical sophistication, modern (neoclassical) economists interested in
building microfundations for macroeconomics soon recurred to the refinement proposed in
the 1950s by Arrow and Debreu [13], who showed that also individual intertemporal (on an
infinite horizon) optimization yields a GE, as soon as the economy is equipped with perfect
price foresights for each future state of nature and a complete set of Arrow-securities mar-
kets [14], all open at time zero and closed simultaneously. Whenever these conditions hold
true, the GE is an allocation that maximizes a properly defined social welfare function or,
in other terms, the equilibrium is Pareto-efficient (First Welfare Theorem).3
As already anticipated, the weaknesses of the epistemological status of the GE model are
so deep to have been fully recognized at various stages by its very proponents. Since this
3 See [15] for a remarkable account of the origin and evolution of the GE concept.
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awareness still encounters huge difficulties in being spread among the profession, however,
it seems worthwhile to provide a concise exposition of the main issues at hand.
1. The GE is neither unique nor locally stable under general conditions. This negative
result, which refers to the work of Sonnenschein [16], Debreu [17] and Mantel [18],
can be summarized along the following lines. Let the aggregate excess demand func-
tion F (p)—obtained from aggregating among individual excess demands f (p)—be a
mapping from the price simplex Π to the commodity space PN . A GE is defined
as a price vector p∗ such that F (p∗) = 0. It turns out that the only conditions that
F (·) inherits from f (·) are continuity, homogeneity of degree zero and the Walras’ law
(i.e., the total value of excess demand is zero). These assure the existence, but neither
the uniqueness nor the local stability of p∗, unless preferences generating individual
demand functions are restricted to very special cases.
2. The existence of a GE is proved via the Brower’s fix point theorem, i.e. by finding a
continuous function g (·) : Π→ Π such that any fix point for g (·) is also an equilibrium
price vector F (p∗) = 0. Suppose that we are interested in finding an algorithm, which,
starting from an arbitrary price vector p, chooses price sequences to check for p∗ and
halt when it finds it. In other terms, to find the GE price vector F (p∗) = 0 means that
halting configurations are decidable. As this violates the undecidability of the halting
problem for Turing Machines, from a recursion theoretic viewpoint the GE solution is
uncomputable [19, 20]. Notice that the same problem applies, in spite of its name, to
the class of Computable GE models [21].
3. By construction, in a GE all transactions are undertaken at the same equilibrium
price vector. Economic theory has worked out two mechanisms capable to reach this
outcome. First, one can assume that buyers and sellers adjust costlessly their optimal
supplies and demands to prices called out by a (explicit or implicit) fictitious auction-
eer, who continues to do his job until he finds a price vector which clears all markets.
Only then transactions take place (Walras’ assumption). Alternatively, buyers and
sellers sign provisional contracts and are allowed to freely (i.e., without any cost) re-
contract until a price vector is found which makes individual plans fully compatible.
Once again, transactions occur only after the equilibrium price vector has been estab-
lished (Edgeworth’s assumption). Regardless of the mechanism one adopts, the GE
6
model is one in which the formation of prices precedes the process of exchange, instead
of being the result of it, through a taˆtonnement process occurring in a meta-time. Real
markets work the other way round and operates in real time, so that the GE model
cannot be considered a scientific explanation of real economic phenomena [22].
4. It has been widely recognized since [23] that integrating money in the theory of value
represented by the GE model is at best problematic. No economic agent can individ-
ually decide to monetize alone; monetary trade should be the equilibrium outcome of
market interactions among optimizing agents. The use of money—that is, a common
medium of exchange and a store of value—implies that one party to a transaction
gives up something valuable (for instance, his endowment or production) for some-
thing inherently useless (a fiduciary token for which he has no immediate use) in the
hope of advantageously re-trading it in the future. Given that in a GE model actual
transactions take place only after a price vector coordinating all trading plans has
been freely found, money can be consistently introduced into the picture only if the
logical keystone of the absence of transaction costs is abandoned. By the same token,
since credit makes sense only if agents can sign contracts in which one side promises
future delivery of goods or services to the other one, in equilibrium markets for debt
are meaningless, both information conditions and information processing requirements
are not properly defined, and bankruptcy can be safely ignored. Finally, as the very
notion of a GE implies that all transactions occur only when individual plans are mu-
tually compatible, and this has to be true also in the labor market, the empirically
observed phenomenon of involuntary unemployment and the microfoundation program
put forth by Lucas and Sargent are logically inconsistent.
5. The only role assigned to time in a GE model is that of dating commodities. Prod-
ucts, technologies and preferences are exogenously given and fixed from the outset. The
convenient implication of banning out-of-equilibrium transactions is simply that of get-
ting rid of any disturbing influence of intermediary modifications of endowments—and
therefore of individual excess demands—on the final equilibrium outcome.
The introduction of non-Walrasian elements into the GE microfoundations pro-
gram—such as fixed or sticky prices, imperfect competition and incomplete markets leading
to temporary equilibrium models—yields interesting Keynesian features such as the break-
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ing of the Say’s law and scope for a monetary theory of production, a rationale for financial
institutions and a more persuasive treatment of informational frictions. As argued in [24],
however, all these approaches preserve a Walrasian perspective in that models are invariably
closed by a GE solution concept which, implicitly or (more often) not, implies the existence
of a fictitious auctioneer who processes information, calculates equilibrium prices and quan-
tities, and regulates transactions. As a result, if the Walrasian Auctioneer (WA) is removed
the decentralized economy becomes dynamically incomplete, as we are not left with any
mechanism determining how quantities and prices are set and how exchanges occur.
In turn, the flaws of the solution adopted by mainstream macroeconomists to overcome
the problems of uniqueness and stability of equilibrium on the one hand, and of analytically
tractability on the other one—i.e., the usage of a Representative Agent (RA) whose choices
summarize those of the whole population of agents—, are so pervasive and well known that
it seems worthless to discuss them here. Interested readers are referred to [25–27].
III. A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO MACROECONOMICS
The research methodology we endorse in trying to explain successes and failures of the
invisible hand consists in discarding the Walrasian GE approach to the microfoundation
program, as well as its RA shorthand version. Instead of asking to deductively prove the
existence of an equilibrium price vector p∗ such that F (p∗) = 0, we aimed at explicitly
constructing it by means of an algorithm or rule. From an epistemological perspective, this
implies a shift from the realm of classical to that of constructive theorizing [28].4 Clearly, the
act of computationally constructing a (fully or not) coordinated state—instead of imposing
it via the WA—for a decentralized economic system requires a complete description of goal-
directed economic agents and their interaction structure.
Agent-based computational economics (ACE)—that is the use of computer simula-
tions to study evolving complex systems composed of many autonomous interacting
agents—represents an effective implementation of such a research agenda [29]. ACE allows
an explicit modeling of identifiable, goal-directed, adapting agents, situated in an explicit
space and interacting locally in it. In complex adaptive systems local interactions involves
4 Epstein (in [29]) prefers to talk of a generative approach to scientific explanation, but the meaning is
basically the same.
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the spontaneous formation of macroscopic structures which can not be directly deduced by
looking at individual behaviors. The equilibrium of a system does not require any more that
every single element is in equilibrium by itself, but rather that the statistical distributions
describing aggregate phenomena are stable, i.e. in “[...] a state of macroscopic equilibrium
maintained by a large number of transitions in opposite directions” ([30], p. 356). A conse-
quence of the idea that macroscopic phenomena can emerge is that the strong reductionist
vision retained by neoclassicals is basically wrong. Once again, these concepts should be fa-
miliar to economists, at least to those who pay attention to the history of economic thought,
since they mirror the notion of spontaneous market order or catallaxy put forth by the Nobel
Prize in economics Friedrich von Hayek. According to him, a clear definition of the laws of
property, tort and contract is enough to regulate a set of trial and error exchange relation-
ships, which succeeds in coordinating the plans of an interdependent network of individuals
endowed with a multiplicity of competing ends. In contrast, Hayek argues that the notion
of competitive GE is “unfortunate, since it presupposes that the facts have already all been
discovered and competition, therefore, has ceased” ([31], p. 184).
It must be emphasized, however, that the abandonment of the GE solution concept does
not come at no cost. The optimality of a competitive GE associated with the First Wel-
fare Theorem implies that welfare comparisons between alternative macroeconomic states
can be meaningfully carried out. An operational method for performing aggregate welfare
comparisons also in macro ACE models has been advanced by Tesfatsion (in [29]). The
idea consists in defining an ideal benchmark (for instance, the GDP in correspondence of
continual market clearing) and comparing it to the simulation outcomes. We can say the
system has reached a catallaxy if the distance between the simulated time series for GDP
and the ideal reference path differs by less than a tolerance level τ .
IV. THE C@S PROJECT5
In [33] we grow a sequential economy populated by a finite number of firms i = 1, . . . , I,
workers/consumers j = 1, . . . , J , and banks b = 1, . . . , B, who undertake decisions at dis-
crete times t = 1, . . . , T on three markets, that is one for a homogeneous non-storable
5 The acronym stands for “Complex Adaptive Trivial System”. For an exposition of the key issues and
earlier results of this research program see [32].
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consumption good, one for labor services and one for credit services. Notional prices and
quantities are chosen in an adaptive way, according to rules of thumb buffeted by idiosyn-
cratic random disturbances. All three markets are characterized by decentralized search and
matching processes, which imply individual, and a fortiori aggregate, out-of-equilibrium dy-
namics. Thus, due to the absence of any exogenously imposed market-clearing mechanism,
nothing prevents the economy from being characterized by a spontaneous order and the
contemporaneous occurrence of persistent involuntary unemployment, unsold production,
excess individual demands and credit rationing.
The sequence of events occurring in each period runs as follows.
a. At the beginning of any t, firms and banks check their financial viability as inherited
from the past, and either they continue to operate if their neat wealth is positive, or
if it is lower or equal to zero they shut down due to bankruptcy. In the latter case, a
string of new firms/banks equal in number to the bankrupted ones enter the market.
Entrants are simply random copies of incumbents.
b. Starting from the demand it expects to face, De
it
, each operating firm determines the
amount of output to be produced and the amount of labor to be hired. Expectations
on future demand are updated adaptively:
De
it
=


Dit−1 (1 + ρit) if Dit−1 > Yit−1
Dit−1 if Dit−1 = Yit−1
Dit−1 (1− ρit) if Dit−1 < Yit−1
(IV.1)
where Dit−1 was the demand faced by firm i during t− 1, Yit−1 was its supply, and ρit
is an idiosyncratic shock distributed on a positive support. The ith firm sets Yit = D
e
it
and, via the CRS technology Yit = aitLit, calculates its labor demand. Regardless of
the scale of output, production takes one whole period.
c. A fully decentralized labor market opens. Firms set their wage bids (actually each of
them sets a maximum wage, as a function of its own financial soundness), and post
their vacancies on the basis of their labor demand. Workers, in turn, accept a job
only if the wage they are offered is higher than their individual satisfying wage. A
sequential matching procedure determines whether unfilled vacancies and unemployed
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workers remain after the labor market has closed. Firms then pay their wage bill Wit
in order to start production.
d. If internal financial resources are in short supply for paying wages, firms can enter a
fully decentralized credit market and fill in a fixed number of applications to obtain
credit. We assume that due to prudential regulation, the total amount of loans supplied
by each bank is proportional to its equity. Banks allocate credit collecting individual
demands, sorting them in descending order according to the financial viability of firms,
and satisfy them until all credit supply has been exhausted. The contractual interest
rate is calculated applying a mark-up (function of financial viability) on a exogenously
determined baseline.
e. After production is completed, a market for goods opens. Any of the ith firm posts its
offer price according to the adaptive rule:
P s
it
=


Pit−1 (1 + ηit) if Dit−1 > Yit−1
Pit−1 if Dit−1 = Yit−1
Pit−1 (1− ηit) if Dit−1 < Yit−1
(IV.2)
where ηit is an idiosyncratic random disturbance distributed on a positive support.
Prices are not allowed to be lower than expected average costs, however. The demand
for consumer goods is given by the whole labor income. Consumers muddle through
the market searching for a satisfying deal. When the consumer j identifies a firm with
the lowest price in the neighborhood he can visit at no cost, he stops and concludes a
transactions. If a firm ends up with excess supply, it gets rid of the unsold goods at
zero costs.
f. Firms collect revenues, calculate profits, update their net worth and, if internal re-
sources are enough, pay back their debt obligations. Firms employ part of retained
profits in an R&D investment, aimed at increasing the productivity parameter ait.
Returns from the R&D investment are governed by a stochastic process.
The model is then completed with operational choices regarding procurement and match-
ing processes, rationing methods, search costs, and statistical distributions for random dis-
turbances. For instance, in structuring labor and goods markets we follow the lesson deliv-
ered by two distinguished scholars, Arthur Okun [34] and John Hicks [35], who suggested
11
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FIG. 1: Macroeconomic regularities emerging from simulations: (a) GDP (in log); (b) inflation
rate; (c) unemployment rate; (d) firms’ size distribution
to explicitly relate macroeconomic performance with non-Walrasian features like long-term
employer-worker relationships and buyer-seller fidelity in customer markets. The great flex-
ibility of the agent-based methodology we employ allows us to conduct experiments with
alternative assumptions in a computable laboratory. We refer to [33] for all other technical
details.
Panels (a) to (d) of FIG. 1 present some selected results from simulations. In spite of the
12
absence of any imposed GE closing of the model, the aggregate dynamics emerging from
decentralized market interactions among 1000 firms, 5000 worker/consumers and 100 banks
is far from being violently instable. Aggregate output or GDP (Panel a) follows a sustained
increasing path, and it mimics some well-known stylized facts of business cycle fluctuations,
like alternating phases of smooth and large output variability, rare but significant crises
(e.g., simulation periods 108–109, 354–362, 376–377), and segmented trends (e.g., periods
351–401 vs. 402–500). Both the CPI inflation rate (Panel b) and the unemployment rate
(Panel c) remain inside a stationary corridor. It seems interesting to note that the aggregate
stability is fully consistent with wide heterogeneity. In Panel (d), for instance, we report
the firms’ size distribution as emerging at period 500 from an original uniform distribution.
It clearly follows a power law, another renown regularity of industrial dynamics.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding sections of this paper have been dedicated to four issues: 1) to intro-
duce a key research question fascinating economists since the beginning of the discipline,
that is that of explaining how millions of autonomous individuals with competing ends suc-
ceed in coordinating their economic activities by trading on fully decentralized markets;
2) to provide a critical assessment of the methodological solution endorsed by mainstream
macroeconomists, who try to reconcile individual behaviors and aggregate economic phe-
nomena (e.g., GDP, CPI, unemployment, income distribution) by means of Walrasian GE
analysis; 3) to briefly discuss an alternative methodology, that is one rooted on an agent-
based constructive approach; 4) to present some results from recent work undertaken along
this latter and, according to us, much safer road to attain a reconciliation of micro and
macroeconomic theory.
In the remainder of this section, we shall discuss possible directions for future research.
Three lines seem particularly promising. The first one consists in using our ACE macroecon-
omy as a computational laboratory in which market processes and institutions are allowed to
grow endogenously from scratch. This requires an explicit treatment of transaction and com-
munication costs, and a testable theory of how intermediaries (brokers and dealers) emerge.
While interesting work in the ACE literature already exists (see e.g. [36, 37]), our main
concern is in assessing the endogenous co-evolution of markets, institutional arrangements
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and macroeconomic dynamics. For instance, an interesting question is how job creation and
destruction and wage and price setting decisions at the firm level interact over the business
cycle in correspondence of alternative market structures. The second line of future inves-
tigation will deal with validation exercises [38]. From this viewpoint, we can distinguish
among: 1) descriptive output validation, when simulated data are compared with data from
real economies (e.g., macroeconomic time series and income distribution data for industrial-
ized countries); 2) predictive output validation, in which computationally generated output
is to be matched with yet-to-acquired real data. Clearly, predictive validation must come
with careful thinking about how to collect new data on possibly unexplored regularities;
3) input validation, insuring that market micro-structures, institutional arrangements and
behavioral rules incorporated into the model capture salient aspects of real-world economies.
This requires an interplay of field-level data collection, human-based experiments and com-
putational design [39].
Finally, the baseline model in its validated version can be used as a computational lab-
oratory to compare the welfare-increasing performance of alternative monetary, fiscal or
regulatory policies [40, 41].
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